

Historical Racism and Discrimination:

Newark Riots of 1967

Newark, a port city in New Jersey founded by Puritans in 1666, possessed a strong Black community for much of its history, yet this community existed outside of the White public sphere. This Black community published their own newspapers, participated in their own ceremonies, and formed their own societies, creating a distinct circle separate from the White population (Mumford, 2007, p. 17). Throughout many periods of the long Civil Rights movement, White citizens of Newark vigorously resisted Black American integration in their city, maintaining societal segregation (Mumford, 2007, p. 18). In 1883, the City of Newark passed legislation prohibiting segregation in hotels, restaurants, and transportation, yet what could have been sweeping and unprecedented reform of 19th century Civil Rights policy was ultimately undermined when consecutive policies for equal protection and education were blatantly disregarded by White Newarkers (Mumford, 2007, p. 19). The culture of Jim Crow was alive and well in a city that saw neighborhoods of many different demographics tightly compacted next to each other (Mumford, 2007, p. 22).

The Great Migration, which resulted in 1.2 million Black Southerners heading North due to World War I labor shortages, was emphasized by ambitious recruitment and enthusiasm for a new place (Mumford, 2007, p. 20). According to demographers Lieberson and Wilkinson, the migrating Black Southerners did find some success in the economic opportunities of the North, with an inconsequential difference between the incomes of Black native Northerners and themselves (Lieberson & Wilkinson, 1976, p. 209). Overall, northern cities offered Black Americans economic opportunities unavailable in much of the South—indeed, many migrated to northern cities during and after World War I and World War II when employers faced a shortage

of workers. Overall, however, Black Newarkers were confined to what one observer called "the meanest and dirtiest jobs," (Sugrue, 2008, p. 12).

Integration continued to spread throughout the Central Ward of Newark (otherwise known as the heart of the city, and predominantly black), and into the South, West, and North Wards, with the North Wards containing a large Italian migrant population (Mumford, 2007, p. 62). By 1961, the Civil Rights movement officially entered Newark, with the Freedom Riders, Civil Rights activists from the South, congregating in Newark's Military Park before continuing their journey to other Southern states (Mumford, 2007, p. 78).

The Newark Riots of 1967

Six years later, the inciting incident of the Newark Riots would be the arrest and subsequent beating of cab driver John William Smith at the hands of White police officers (Mumford, 2007, p. 98). According to those living in apartments that face the Fourth Precinct Station House, they were able to see Smith being dragged in through the precinct doors. As recounted in the Kerner Commission, "Within a few minutes, at least two civil rights leaders received calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was being beaten by the police. When one of the persons at the station notified the cab company of Smith's arrest, cab drivers all over the city began learning of it over their cab radios," (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 1968, p. 33). After the police refused to negotiate with civil rights leaders representing a mob that formed outside, the crowd was dispersed by force, and reports of looting came in not long after. The Newark riots had begun, and they would end up being the most destructive race riot amongst the forty riots that occurred since Watts two years earlier (Reeves, 1967). The violence, looting, and firebombing became so severe that units of both State Police and National Guardsmen were sent into the Central Ward to lay siege to the city

(Reeves, 1967). According to newspaper articles written about the riots, “Scores of Negroes were taken into custody, although the police said that 75 had been arrested...the injured in the hundreds...more than 100 persons had been treated [in hospital] alone,” (Reeves, 1967). Additionally, “A physician at Newark City Hospital said four persons had been admitted there with gunshot wounds...stabbed or struck by rocks, bottles, and bricks,” (Carroll, 1967) showcasing that police violence during the Newark riots was indiscriminate, racially charged, and often fatal (Bergeson, 1982, p. 265). The initiating events in Newark would spread to other major urban centers in New Jersey in the week following the riots, with varying degrees of severity. Understanding the history of Newark, the inciting events of these riots, and the progress of these riots is key to uncovering Newark’s and, in a broader sense, New Jersey’s role in the Civil Rights movement.

Lasting Effects on the City of Newark

Twenty-six people died during the Newark riots, most of whom were Black residents of the city, and over 700 people were injured or hospitalized during the riots. The property damage resulting from the looting and fires valued at over ten million dollars, and spaces still exist where buildings once stood (Rojas & Atkinson, 2017). The long-term physical and psychological effects of the riots on the people of Newark and on the reputation of the city itself cannot be understated (Rojas & Atkinson, 2017). Beyond the pain and grief caused by the loss of life and property, the riots represented a paradigm shift for Newark as a city. The eruptive violence in the city streets was perhaps the final nail in the coffin arranged by systemic racism, as Newark’s reputation as a dangerous city plagued by violence and corruption solidified in the minds of its former White residents and White generations long after (Rojas & Atkinson, 2017). As a result, the entrenched Black communities of Newark found themselves losing tax revenue and job

opportunities quickly. The disadvantages that came from the riots and their causes only further incentivized White families to keep their tax dollars and children as far away from Newark as possible; this also occurred during a time in which taxes for police, fire, and medical services were being increased to compensate emergency departments for their involvement in the riots (Treadwell, 1992). Areas such as Springfield Avenue, once a highly commercialized street, were turned into abandoned, boarded up-buildings, further contributing to Newark's negative reputation (Treadwell, 1992). What once were public housing projects, well lived-in homes, and family businesses remain vacant and crumbling, if not already demolished from the looting and fires fifty years ago which much of Newark did not rebuild (Treadwell, 1992). Even church buildings which once conveyed a sense of openness to all of the public are lined with fences and barbed-wire to prevent looting and vandalism (Treadwell, 1992). The riots did lead to Black and Latino Americans vying for political positions that previously belonged to the White population, ushering in the election of the first Black mayor and first Black city council members in Newark in 1970 (Treadwell, 1992). Despite Black Americans gaining some control politically, the Central Ward still lacked economic and social renewal, with any efforts towards regenerating Newark failing to undo the larger effects of the riots of 1967 (Treadwell, 1992). Any of the limited economic development that did occur was largely restricted to "White areas", such as downtown Newark, as opposed to the Black communities ("50 Years Later," 2017). Larry Hamm, appointed to the Board of Education at 17 years old by Newark's first Black mayor, expounds on the economic disparity between Black and White Newarkers, with "dynamism [prevalent] downtown, and poverty in the neighborhoods," (Hampson, 2017). Fifty years after the riots, police brutality remains a constant for Black Newarkers, with a 2016 investigation into the Newark police department finding that officers were still making illegal and illegitimate

arrests, often using excessive force and retaliatory actions against the Black population (“50 Years Later,” 2017). A city with a large Black population, one third of Newark residents remain below the poverty line, with Newark residents only representing one fifth of the city’s jobs (Hampson, 2017). Despite the foothold that Black Americans have gained in Newark’s politics, the economic power largely remains in the hands of White corporations and organizations (Hampson, 2017). Other economic factors, such as increases in the cost of insurance due to increased property risk, tax increases for increased police and fire protection, and businesses and job opportunities either closing or moving to different (Whiter) neighborhoods following White flight also have a significant lasting economic impact on the city (“How the 1960s’ Riots Hurt African-Americans,” 2004). The people of Newark were also affected psychologically and emotionally. On one hand, many Black Americans felt empowered - their community had risen against injustice and was largely successful in catching the nation’s attention despite the lack of real organization, challenging the system that desperately tried to keep them isolated and creating a movement that emphasized their power (“Outcomes and Impacts - the North,” 2021). Yet, just as many Black Americans became hopeless, seeing a country and its law enforcement continue to disregard their lives and stability, treating them as secondary citizens despite the many legal changes made under the guise of creating equality (CBS New York, 2020). The riots of 1967 destroyed Newark’s reputation and economic stability, steeping the population in poverty. While the Black Community used this opportunity to gain political power in the city and to jumpstart the Black Power movement in New Jersey, many Black Newarkers remain in despair, seeing their community members injured and killed with no change to the systemic cycle of racism that perpetuates the city.

Newark Riot Panel Calls Police Action 'Excessive'

By HOMER BIGART

Special to The New York Times

NEWARK, Feb. 10—A special commission studying last summer's riots in New Jersey charged today that Newark police, state police and National Guardmen used "excessive and unjustified force" against Negroes.

The commission implied that

Text of introduction to the report is on Page 80.

innocent bystanders had been killed by "indiscriminate" shooting and found "evidence of prejudice against Negroes during the riot on the part of various police and National Guard elements."

"There should be no mass firing at buildings that police may suspect of harboring criminals," the 10-member Select Commission on Civil Disorder said in its report to Governor Richard J. Hughes.

Both Negroes and whites in Newark sense "a pervasive feeling of corruption" at City Hall, the report said. The commission proposed a special grand jury investigation of the alleged corruption.

In describing the tensions and frustrations that led to the riots of July 12-17 in which 26 persons were killed and more than 1,000 injured, the commission said it had seen no evidence of any improvement in relations between the Negro community and the police. Distrust, resentment and bitterness continued.

The report depicted the Newark Police Department as ill-equipped and unprepared psychologically for the outbreak, although signs of tension had been clearly apparent.

It also cited testimony from Newark's Police Director, Dominick Spina, that National Guardmen were "trigger-happy."

The commission's report went on to say that other testimony "strongly suggested" that state police elements, with some help from National Guardmen, staged a senseless reprisal just when the disorders had begun to ebb, shooting up stores operated by Negroes in an action that em-

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Newark Riot Panel Charges Police Action Against Negroes Was 'Excessive'

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battered the Negro community.

The commission recommended that the state take over the city's public school system to end an "educational crisis" here. State operation of a local public school system is virtually unknown.

Newark was urged to follow the example of New York City by trying to decentralize the school system. Further, the commission proposed the abolition of Municipal Courts and the transfer of their responsibilities to state courts, which the commission said were "more politically insulated."

The report criticized the "assembly-line" brand of justice in the Municipal Courts with their air of confusion, lack of dignity, and speed of proceedings. The actual time spent on each hearing ranged from two to 12 minutes, the commission said.

"There is a widespread feeling in the Negro community," the report said, that the Municipal Court or some of its magistrates discriminate against blacks both in conviction and sentencing."

The commission said it had found no evidence that any of the grievances that lacerated the Negro community had been removed.

Depicted as Confused

On civic corruption, the commission noted that four grand jury presentments in the last seven years had charged political interferences with the Police Department and lack of enforcement of gambling laws. Yet no effective action was taken to follow up these presentments, the commission said.

Commenting on the report, Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio said he feared it might cost Newark "in the role of handy scape-

goat—the terrible place where terrible people did everything wrong."

He did not comment more specifically, saying he wanted more time to study the report, but another official said City Hall would welcome "with cheers" a grand jury investigation.

The Mayor also supported the recommendation for a regional government and for state control of the public schools, the spokesman said.

Donald Malafronte, administrative assistant to the Mayor, said the Mayor did not receive an official copy of the report until this evening although it had been distributed to press media on Friday. This was deeply resented at City Hall, he said.

Mayor Addonizio and Police Director Spina failed to recognize the depth of the Negro community's bitterness, the commission said.

The Mayor was pictured as confused when the riots got out of control and incapable of making decisions.

The report quoted a state police official's account of his first meeting with the Mayor at 3 A.M. on July 14:

"I asked him [Addonizio] what the situation was. He said, 'It is all gone, the whole town is gone.' I asked him where the problem was. He said, 'It is all over.' I asked him if he had any idea of the instigators or troublemakers or what we should look for. He didn't know."

An almost complete lack of communication developed among local, state and National Guard forces, the commission learned. That was largely because their radios were operating on different frequencies.

None of these forces had received any training in routing snipers from buildings. In the confusion they sprayed buildings with bullets "indiscriminately," the report said.

Noting that a report by the Newark Police Department said that 11 deaths from shooting were from undetermined sources, the commission concluded:

"The location of death, the number of wounds, the manner in which the wounds were afflicted all raise grave doubts about the circumstances under which many of these people died. . . . These homicides are

matters of grave concern and should be quickly and exhaustively investigated and resolved by appropriate grand juries."

The only critical reference to the Negro role in the Newark riots was made in the introduction. The commission said:

"If the events of last July had one effect, it was to show that we can no longer escape the issue. The question is whether we shall resort to illusion or finally come to grips with reality."

"The illusion is that force alone will solve the problem. But our society cannot deliver on its promises when terror stalks the street and disorder and lawlessness tear our communities apart."

"No group of people can better themselves by rioting and breaking laws that were enacted for the benefit and protection of everyone. Riots must be condemned."

The 10-member commission, which included two former Governors and three Negroes, recommended sweeping reforms in Newark's police, legal and educational systems.

It called for an end of political interference in the Police Department. It urged greater efforts to recruit Negro and Puerto Rican policemen and said qualified Negro lieutenants and captains should be placed in command positions.

Although Newark's population of just under 400,000 is at least 52 per cent Negro and about 10 per cent Spanish-speaking, the commission found that there were only 149 Negroes and one Puerto Rican on the police force, which has an authorized strength of 1,512 members.

Negro policemen interviewed by the commission "made it clear . . . that the department is not eager to have them," the report said.

The Negroes also suspected that those who supported the Addonizio administration were favored in assignments.

Other recommendations by the commission called for:

• Appointment of a board of police commissioners "representing the total Newark community" to review all citizen complaints of police misconduct.

• Creation by the business community of programs to hire, upgrade and train slum residents for jobs, and the elimina-

tion of discriminatory practices in labor unions.

• Creation by the state of a master plan for the control of civil disorders.

• Increased riot training for police, restricted use of firearms in riot control, and the establishment of year-round task forces to maintain communication between City Hall and the slums.

• A comprehensive summer program providing jobs and recreation.

The commission said that if Mayor Addonizio again refused, as he did two years ago, to name a civilian review board to look into complaints against the police, there should be legislation enabling the State Supreme Court to appoint the proposed five-man board.

To many Negroes the Police Department has a "hostile and

oppressive image," the report said.

It recommended that the proposed use of police dogs be dropped, holding that the technical benefits of a canine corps would be "far outweighed by the hostile response this proposal has evoked in a large sector of the community."

The commission also examined racial disorders in Plainfield, where a white policeman was killed by Negro youths, and in Englewood.

Nowhere did the commission find any evidence of an organized conspiracy by the Negroes.

It cited conflicting testimony by Newark Police Director Spina, who indicated at one point that a conspiracy existed but at another point said, "We have no actual evidence of any outside conspiracy."

The commission said that of 91 persons arrested on weapons charges during the Newark riots, only 18 were from out of town. Of the 18, all but two were from communities neighboring Newark, and two were from out of state — one from Brooklyn and one from Atlanta.

In their findings the members of the commission disagreed on only one point. A minority felt that Newark was so bankrupt that the only way to deal with the situation was outright consolidation of the city with neighboring communities under an Essex County government.

The majority felt that total consolidation was not realizable now. So the commission's proposal was that only certain basic services, such as police protection, should be consolidated throughout the county.

Description: This source highlights what actions were used against the Black community of Newark during the riots, and calls for change to the school systems of Newark and the abolition of its Municipal Courts, citing that the institutions are inherently segregated and racist. This source exposes the public opinion of Newark residents in the months following the 1967 riots, the calls to change they made in light of the protests, and the response to these calls that political figures in Newark had to the riots and demands.

Bigart, Homer. "Newark Riot Panel Calls Police Action 'Excessive'; Newark Riot Panel

Charges Police Action against Negroes Was 'Excessive.'" The New York Times.

The New York Times, February 11, 1968.

Courtrooms Calm as Trials Start For 27 Indicted in Newark Riots

By WALTER H. WAGGONER

Special to The New York Times

NEWARK, Sept. 25—Twenty seven persons indicted for crimes during the July riots here went on trial today in four unexpectedly quiet Essex County courtrooms.

The trials represented the start of the county's prosecution of about 200 people indicted for such offenses as arson, looting and carrying weapons during the five days of rioting that brought death to 26 and injuries to more than 1,000.

In the only dispositions today, two defendants were found guilty and one pleaded guilty.

Theodore J. Woodard, 22 years old, arrested by a trooper on July 16, was found guilty of possessing a .22-caliber zip gun, and Roosevelt Torain, 32 was found guilty of assault and battery for striking Newark Detective Richard Ballard with a flashlight on July 14.

George Willie Eunice, 38, pleaded guilty to possessing a knife.

Grand juries, originally indicted about 700 people, but Brendan Byrne, the Essex County prosecutor, announced yesterday that the charges against all but about 200 had been reduced to lesser, non-indictable offenses.

Basing his decision to reduce the charges on similar actions taken by those prosecuting rioters in Los Angeles and Detroit, Mr. Byrne said of the Newark defendants:

"The charges against them were reduced to lesser, non-indictable offenses because what they took was small, we subsequently downgraded to nonindictable offenses."

Forty-one persons were at first listed for trial today, but the trials of 14 were postponed until next month.

The 14 included LeRoi Jones, the militant Negro playwright, who is charged with carrying a weapon, and John W. Smith, the Negro cab driver whose arrest on the night of July 13 helped touch off the riots. He is charged with assault on policemen.

At a rally on the county courthouse steps yesterday, Mr. Jones warned that there would be a large demonstration by Negroes when the hearings got under way.

As a result, security restrictions were imposed today, with city police and county detectives and a state police contingent prominently in evidence.

However, the attendance in the four courtrooms was lighter than usual today, and there were no disturbances. In another development, Mr. Byrne had been named the defendant in a suit filed yesterday in Federal District Court, which asked the court to end the prosecution of the riot cases that got under way this morning.

The petition, filed by a group of 13 Negro plaintiffs, charges the racial discrimination against Negroes and violation of their civil rights.

The New York Times

Published: September 26, 1967
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Description: This source shows one of the effects of the Newark riots, which is the trial of 27 Newark residents who allegedly committed crimes during the riots. It identifies what crimes were committed during the riots, how many charges were dropped, and how riots in other areas, such as Los Angeles, impacted the way the riots in Newark were handled. This source provides key information on the immediate aftermath of the riots, and how many lives were impacted by the events.

Waggoner, Walter H. "Courtrooms Calm as Trials Start for 27 Indicted in Newark Riots."

The New York Times. The New York Times, September 26, 1967.



TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES: Thomas Jones, carrying one of his seven children, following a funeral director yesterday toward the burial ground of his wife, Mrs. Jessie Mae Jones, who was killed during the Newark violence.

Jersey Will Seek U.S. Funds to Rebuild Newark

By DOUGLAS ROBINSON
Special to The New York Times

NEWARK, July 17—A high-ranking state official will leave for Washington tomorrow in search of Federal emergency funds to help rebuild this shattered city.

Paul N. Yivisaker, New Jersey's Commissioner of Community Affairs, said he would ask the Federal Government for money to provide food, medicine, rent supplements and loans to small businesses and other essentials.

State and city officials, haggard and bleary-eyed from five sleepless nights at command posts, said short-term Federal funds would be used to assist thousands of victims of the rioting in Newark's ravaged Negro sections.

Long-Range Program

They also promised renewed efforts to get additional funds for long-range antipoverty programs, such as those for better schools, improved housing and reduced unemployment.

The leaders stressed, however, that they would not be placed in the position of being "giving out dollars as a reward for racial violence. These funds, already being used for the food supplies that were given out today at 11 distribution centers in the Negro section," Mr. Yivisaker said.

Mr. Yivisaker said he would have representatives of the Health, Education and Welfare Department, the Attorney General, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Labor Department and city officials

Riot Victims Would Get Food, Medicine, Business Loans and Money for Rent

ment and the Housing and Urban Development Department. He said these meetings would be used to explore the possibility of obtaining immediate funds without having to have special laws passed.

Mr. Yivisaker said he realized that Washington did not have unlimited funds to help the city, but he said he would see if the state had overlooked any source of funds that might be available.

Speed-Up of Funds

"We will make every effort to point out the hardships suffered by the people of Newark," he said at a news conference.

Mr. Yivisaker said he would also urge a speed-up of money for the long-range ghetto projects, which, he said, had been slowed in recent months.

He disclosed that part of some \$6.5-million already allocated by the New Jersey Legislature for antipoverty programs was available for use in aiding the homeless and destitute. These funds, he said, are already being used for the food supplies that were given out today at 11 distribution centers in the Negro section.

Some 20 staff members of the Community Affairs Department have already opened an office at 1100 Raymond Boulevard to help ease the plight of many residents.

Meantime, Federal, state and city antipoverty officials

loured the riot area, assessing the damage and the cost of rehabilitation. The tour was a prelude to a series of meetings on specific projects to bring order from disaster.

Mr. Yivisaker also discussed the possibility of establishing a state regional agency that would, with Federal help, provide continuing service for the poor in such northern New Jersey cities as Newark, Plainfield, East Orange, Jersey City and Paterson, all areas of racial tension.

He indicated that about \$500,000 might soon be available from the Ford Foundation for a long-term unemployment program.

A spokesman for the city, Donald Malafrente, an administrative assistant to Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio, said that Newark officials would emphasize economic assistance to those injured innocently, rather than to those who were rioting.

He added that those whose homes were chopped up by fusillades of bullets directed at suspected snipers would also be considered for city help.

An office of the Small Business Administration has been opened at city hall to assist those applying for loans to rebuild or repair pillaged stores.

Mr. Malafrente said that a local organization known as TEAM (Total Employment and Manpower, Inc.) would continue preparing a \$4.3-million project sponsored by the Federal Department of Labor to train unemployed ghetto residents for jobs. Work on the program was interrupted by the disorder.

Description: This source provides information on how politicians in Newark vocalized their immediate responses from the riots, as well as how impactful the riots were on Newark and the public, relying on funding from the Federal Government to mitigate some of those damaging effects. It also shows the effectiveness of the riots in gaining attention to many of the racial issues plaguing the Black neighborhoods in Newark, such as more funding for Black neighborhoods, implementing welfare and poverty programs, and unemployment programs. Noting the date on this source, it shows the immediate response the public had to the riots, the national attention it would bring, and how the riots were successful at bringing many of the issues Newarkers were rioting for/against to the political discussion.

Robinson, Douglas. "Jersey Will Seek U.S. Funds to Rebuild Newark; Riot Victims Would Get Food, Medicine, Business Loans and Money for Rent." The New York Times. The New

York Times, July 18, 1967.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1967/07/18/archives/jersey-will-see-us-funds-to-rebuild-newark-rioters-would-get.html>

NEWARK'S MAYOR CALLS IN GUARD AS RIOTS SPREAD

DOWNTOWN IS HIT

Scores Are Injured—Police Instructed to Return Fire

By MAURICE CARROLL

Special to The New York Times
NEWARK, Friday, July 14—The National Guard was called into this riot-torn city early today as Negro mobs spilled from their Central Ward ghetto into the heart of the downtown business district.

Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio telephoned Gov. Richard J. Hughes at 2:20 A.M. and told the Governor that the rampaging Negroes who had looted, burned and smashed their way through the city in the second straight night of violence had produced an "ominous situation."

The Mayor's office said the request for aid had been prompted by exchanges of gunfire between the police and rioters, the firebombing of stores and by widespread looting.

Governor Agrees

He asked the Governor to send in National Guardsmen and state troopers. The Governor agreed. There was no immediate estimate as to the size of the reinforcements. The state police were expected to arrive before dawn and the Guard during the day.

As the Mayor spoke to the Governor, shotgun-wielding policemen guarded firemen who were fighting a raging blaze at Broad and Market Streets, the center of downtown Newark.

The huge fire drew hundreds of Negroes to it, although a fire department official denied that the blaze, which swept a luggage store and a jewelry shop, had been set by the rioters.

Bands of Negroes broke from the crowd as the fire raged to race through the business district. They smashed windows and scooped up whatever loot they could find.

Police Fire in Air

Gunshots were heard in the

LOOTED: Policeman and three others standing behind fence of jeweler and pawnshop on Springfield Avenue in Newark. The shop was broken into during rampage last night.

Guard Called as Newark Riots Spread

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

when fired upon, or otherwise placed in jeopardy, and to take more drastic action to quell the mobs.

At least 60 persons were reported to have been injured in the rioting last night and this morning. The police said at least 75 persons had been arrested.

A physician at Newark City Hospital said four persons had been admitted there with gunshot wounds. The others who were injured had been stabbed or struck by rocks, bottles and bricks.

The disturbance began outside the Fourth Precinct station house in the Central Ward at about 7:35 P.M. yesterday. It soon spread down Springfield Avenue and into the heart of the downtown business district.

Outburst Wednesday

The station house, which was pelted by rocks and bottles and looted by Negro crowds Wednesday night.

The Mayor's office said exchanges of gunfire had taken place between it and rioters in the West Ward, the East Ward—which is the downtown area—and in the Central Ward.

The gunfire aimed at the police was reported to be coming from cars and rooftops.

Officials also reported that one store on Broad Street had been fire-bombed. And there had been extensive looting at a Sears store in the South Ward.

Earlier, thousands of Negroes had collected along a 20-block stretch of downtown Newark, Springfield Avenue, a street lined with cheap furniture stores, hair parlor and a Negro barber. The rioting spread to the street, and looting had been reported at stores in another section.

Gunfire was heard repeatedly in the troubled area.

Scores Are in Custody

A score of Negroes were taken into custody, although some had actually been arrested. Unofficial reports, however, said that the police had arrested a hundred. A barred nurse at Newark City Hospital said more than 100 persons had been treated there since.

The latest trouble grew out of an orderly demonstration in the area of the station house on Wednesday night. It began to turn into rioting when the police gradually widened about 15 policemen near the station house and the rioters.

The police said last night they had fired on the rioters. "We took pride in our police-community relations program," Mr. Black told the city officials. "This night has destroyed what we had built up over the years. We can't sweep this up under a rug. Time is running out. It has gotten to the point where you can't take it any longer."

Donald M. Wendell, associate director of the United Community Council, the city's anti-poverty program, said a white policeman tried to attack the Negroes last night. He was restrained by other officers.

Mr. Wendell said that Oliver Lofton, who heads the Newark Legal Services for the poor, had gone to the station house to try to calm the crowd of Negroes.


A spokesman for Mr. Addonizio said the Mayor would appoint a committee within 10 days to do a study of the rioting and to determine the underlying causes of the rioting.

The spokesman said the committee would include representatives of business, labor and Negro groups. It would investigate the alleged beating of a professional laborer by a group of rioters.

The Mayor has ordered the city to hire a public relations firm to help in the investigation.

After the first rioting of the night, the rioters smashed windows and looted a jewelry store on Springfield Avenue. A Negro woman picked the taxi driver that triggered the rioting.

The police walked 10 minutes between some bars to break rioting for study.



all the basement windows. Someone threw a garbage can under the stairs. As the crowd on the station house street scattered when the first bottle was thrown, one man remained standing. There was a short Negro with a white shirt on in his hand and a cigar stuck squarely in the middle of his mouth.

He said later his name was John Randall and that he was an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He stood drawing calmly on his cigar while bottles and bricks were thrown and when some in the crowd shouted "Uncle Tom's Cabin," he walked casually east toward the area where stores were looted last night.

In the demonstration earlier last night, a dozen or so Negro youngsters marched, carrying signs saying "Operation 'We Care' and 'Don't Throw No Heads,'" and "Black Pollockmen—Where Do You Stand?"

Mayor Holds Meeting

Earlier yesterday, Mayor Addonizio met with more than 20 Negro leaders and heard angry reports of racism and hostility on the part of some Newark policemen—particularly those who were Negroes, about the rioting.

The Negro leaders said such things as "Black and white" were the stages for last night's rioting. They said the most likely cause if further rioting occurred would be the most serious charges.

One of the city's Human Rights Commission, Mr. Black said, witnesses and victims had produced a list of names of those charged. "These are not names nor things that are making these charges," he said. "They are working people."

Mr. Black said his investigation had thus far revealed an unidentified Negro policeman, who was off duty, was summoned by white policemen early Wednesday when he entered the Fourth Precinct. Other white policemen, including a Trenton newsman, stopped the Negro and stopped the Negro from entering the station house.

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Two swarms covering the rioting were reported by the police and the other by a Negro reporter. Bill Lowe, a tall, thin 21-year-old Negro, reported for the Trenton newsman that the rioting had spread to the street, and looting had been reported at stores in another section.

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The latest trouble grew out of an orderly demonstration in the area of the station house on Wednesday night. It began to turn into rioting when the police gradually widened about 15 policemen near the station house and the rioters.

The police said last night they had fired on the rioters. "We took pride in our police-community relations program," Mr. Black told the city officials. "This night has destroyed what we had built up over the years. We can't sweep this up under a rug. Time is running out. It has gotten to the point where you can't take it any longer."

Donald M. Wendell, associate director of the United Community Council, the city's anti-poverty program, said a white policeman tried to attack the Negroes last night. He was restrained by other officers.

Mr. Wendell said that Oliver Lofton, who heads the Newark Legal Services for the poor, had gone to the station house to try to calm the crowd of Negroes.

A spokesman for Mr. Addonizio said the Mayor would appoint a committee within 10 days to do a study of the rioting and to determine the underlying causes of the rioting.

The spokesman said the committee would include representatives of business, labor and Negro groups. It would investigate the alleged beating of a professional laborer by a group of rioters.

The Mayor has ordered the city to hire a public relations firm to help in the investigation.

After the first rioting of the night, the rioters smashed windows and looted a jewelry store on Springfield Avenue. A Negro woman picked the taxi driver that triggered the rioting.

The police walked 10 minutes between some bars to break rioting for study.

all the basement windows. Someone threw a garbage can under the stairs. As the crowd on the station house street scattered when the first bottle was thrown, one man remained standing. There was a short Negro with a white shirt on in his hand and a cigar stuck squarely in the middle of his mouth.

He said later his name was John Randall and that he was an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He stood drawing calmly on his cigar while bottles and bricks were thrown and when some in the crowd shouted "Uncle Tom's Cabin," he walked casually east toward the area where stores were looted last night.

In the demonstration earlier last night, a dozen or so Negro youngsters marched, carrying signs saying "Operation 'We Care' and 'Don't Throw No Heads,'" and "Black Pollockmen—Where Do You Stand?"

Mayor Holds Meeting

Earlier yesterday, Mayor Addonizio met with more than 20 Negro leaders and heard angry reports of racism and hostility on the part of some Newark policemen—particularly those who were Negroes, about the rioting.

The Negro leaders said such things as "Black and white" were the stages for last night's rioting. They said the most likely cause if further rioting occurred would be the most serious charges.

One of the city's Human Rights Commission, Mr. Black said, witnesses and victims had produced a list of names of those charged. "These are not names nor things that are making these charges," he said. "They are working people."

Mr. Black said his investigation had thus far revealed an unidentified Negro policeman, who was off duty, was summoned by white policemen early Wednesday when he entered the Fourth Precinct. Other white policemen, including a Trenton newsman, stopped the Negro and stopped the Negro from entering the station house.

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Description: This source identifies when the National Guard was called into Newark and how the (largely White) public outside of the Black communities of Newark responded to the spread of the riots. It depicts the rising injuries caused by the riots, and politicians' responses to the violence of the riots. This source captures the beginning days of the week-long event, and acts as one of the first sources to analyze when piecing together the events of the riots.

Carroll, Maurice.
"Newark's Mayor Calls in Guard as Riots Spread." New York Times.

New York Times, July 14, 1967.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/14/83616047.html?pageNumber=1>.

IV. NEWARK

The last outburst in Atlanta occurred on Tuesday night, June 20. That same night, in Newark, N.J., a tumultuous meeting of the planning board took place. Until 4 a.m., speaker after speaker from the Negro ghetto arose to denounce the city's intent to turn over 150 acres in the heart of the central ward as a site for the State's new medical and dental college.

The growing opposition to the city administration by vocal black residents had paralyzed both the planning board and the board of education. Tension had been rising so steadily throughout the northern New Jersey area that, in the first week of June, Col. David Kelly, head of the state police, had met with municipal police chiefs to draw up plans for state police support of city police wherever a riot developed. Nowhere was the tension greater than in Newark.

Founded in 1666, the city, part of the Greater New York City port complex, rises from the salt marshes of the Passaic River. Although in 1967 Newark's population of 400,000 still ranked it 30th among American municipalities, for the past 20 years the white middle class had been deserting the city for the suburbs.

In the late 1950's, the desertions had become a rout. Between 1960 and 1967, the city lost a net total of more than 70,000 white residents. Replacing them in vast areas of dilapidated housing where living conditions, according to a prominent member of the County Bar Association, were so bad that "people would be kinder to their pets," were Negro migrants, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. In 6 years, the city switched from

65 percent white to 52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban.

The white population, nevertheless, retained political control of the city. On both the city council and the board of education, seven of nine members were white. In other key boards, the disparity was equal or greater. In the central ward, where the medical college controversy raged, the Negro constituents and their white councilman found themselves on opposite sides of almost every crucial issue.

The municipal administration lacked the ability to respond quickly enough to navigate the swiftly changing currents. Even had it had great astuteness, it would have lacked the financial resources to affect significantly the course of events.

In 1962, seven-term Congressman Hugh Addonizio had forged an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow longtime Irish control of the city hall. A liberal in Congress, Addonizio, when he became mayor, had opened his door to all people. Negroes, who had been excluded from the previous administration, were brought into the government. The police department was integrated.

Nevertheless, progress was slow. As the Negro population increased, more and more of the politically oriented found the progress inadequate.

The Negro-Italian coalition began to develop strains over the issue of the police. The police were largely Italian, the persons they arrested were largely Negro. Community leaders agreed that, as in many police forces, there was a small minority of officers who abused

The Kerner Commission is one of the most important sources regarding the Newark riots of 1967, as it is an official government document outlining the events of the riots, why the riots happened, and the effects the riots had on Newark through extensive research and interviewing. The

1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders Report has unique origins, in which sitting President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 tasked a commission specifically with determining the causes of the rising number of U.S. race riots that had occurred that summer, with the riots in Detroit and Newark acting as catalysts for the founding of the commission. While Johnson essentially anticipated a report that would serve to legitimize his Great Society policies, the Kerner Report would come to be one of the most candid and progressive examinations of how public policy affected Black Americans' lives. The Commission was led by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, and consisted of ten other men, most of whom were White. The only non-white members of the Commission were Roy Wilkins, an NAACP head, and Sen. Edward Brooke, a Republican from Massachusetts. Despite the lack of racial representation on the commission, the members placed themselves in the segregated and redlined Black communities they were writing about, interviewing ordinary Black Americans and relaying their struggles with a humanistic clarity that was largely uncharacteristic of federal politics in the 1960s. This report identified

rampant and blatant racism as the cause of the race riots of 1967, starkly departing from Lyndon B. Johnson's views on race relations and in the process establishing historical legitimacy as a well-supported and largely objective source. The Kerner Commission clearly outlines how segregation, White Flight and police brutality contributed the most to worsening race relations and rising tensions between Black communities and the White municipal governments who mandated said communities. (Depicted is the section specifically on Newark, but the entire document is a useful resource!)

Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Bantam Books, 1968.

[https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03997a&AN=RUL.b1155072&site=eds-live&scope=site.](https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03997a&AN=RUL.b1155072&site=eds-live&scope=site)

their responsibility. This gave credibility to the cries of "brutality!" voiced periodically by ghetto Negroes.

In 1965, Mayor Addonizio, acknowledging that there was "a small group of misguided individuals" in the department, declared that "it is vital to establish once and for all, in the minds of the public, that charges of alleged police brutality will be thoroughly investigated and the appropriate legal or punitive action be taken if the charges are found to be substantiated."

Pulled one way by the Negro citizens who wanted a police review board, and the other by the police, who adamantly opposed it, the mayor decided to transfer "the control and investigation of complaints of police brutality out of the hands of both the police and the public and into the hands of an agency that all can support—the Federal Bureau of Investigation," and to send "a copy of any charge of police brutality * * * directly to the Prosecutor's office." However, the FBI could act only if there had been a violation of a person's federal civil rights. No complaint was ever heard of again.

Nor was there much redress for other complaints. The city had no money with which to redress them.

The city had already reached its legal bonding limit, yet expenditures continued to outstrip income. Health and welfare costs, per capita, were 20 times as great as for some of the surrounding communities. Cramped by its small land area of 23.6 square miles—one-third of which was taken up by Newark Airport and unusable marshland—and surrounded by independent jurisdictions, the city had nowhere to expand.

Taxable property was contracting as land, cleared for urban renewal, lay fallow year after year. Property taxes had been increased, perhaps, to the point of diminishing return. By the fall of 1967, they were to reach \$661.70 on a \$10,000 house—double that of suburban communities.⁸ As a result, people were refusing either to own or to renovate property in the city. Seventy-four percent of white and 87 percent of Negro families lived in rental housing. Whoever was able to move to the suburbs, moved. Many of these persons, as downtown areas were cleared and new office buildings were constructed, continued to work in the city. Among them were a large proportion of the people from whom a city normally draws its civic leaders, but who, after moving out, tended to cease involving themselves in the community's problems.

During the daytime Newark more than doubled its population—and was, therefore, forced to provide services for a large number of people who contributed nothing in property taxes. The city's per capita outlay for police, fire protection, and other municipal services continued to increase. By 1967 it was twice that

⁸ The legal tax rate is \$7.76 per \$100 of market value. However, because of inflation, a guideline of 85.27 percent of market value is used in assessing, reducing the true tax rate to \$6.617 per \$100.

of the surrounding area.

Consequently, there was less money to spend on education. Newark's per capita outlay on schools was considerably less than that of surrounding communities. Yet within the city's school system were 78,000 children, 14,000 more than 10 years earlier.

Twenty thousand pupils were on double sessions. The dropout rate was estimated to be as high as 33 percent. Of 13,600 Negroes between the ages of 16 and 19, more than 6,000 were not in school. In 1960 over half of the adult Negro population had less than an eighth grade education.

The typical ghetto cycle of high unemployment, family breakup, and crime was present in all its elements. Approximately 12 percent of Negroes were without jobs. An estimated 40 percent of Negro children lived in broken homes. Although Newark maintained proportionately the largest police force of any major city, its crime rate was among the highest in the Nation. In narcotics violations it ranked fifth nationally. Almost 80 percent of the crimes were committed within 2 miles of the core of the city, where the central ward is located. A majority of the criminals were Negro. Most of the victims, likewise, were Negro. The Mafia was reputed to control much of the organized crime.



Robert Curvin, CORE official, tries to calm crowd in Newark, July 1967

Under such conditions a major segment of the Negro population became increasingly militant. Largely excluded from positions of traditional political power, Negroes, tutored by a handful of militant social activists who had moved into the city in the early 1960's, made use of the antipoverty program, in which poor people were guaranteed representation, as a political springboard. This led to friction between the United Community Corporation, the agency that administered the antipoverty program, and the city administration.

When it became known that the secretary of the board of education intended to retire, the militants

proposed for the position the city's budget director, a Negro with a master's degree in accounting. The mayor, however, had already nominated a white man. Since the white man had only a high school education, and at least 70 percent of the children in the school system were Negro, the issue of who was to obtain the secretaryship, an important and powerful position, quickly became a focal issue.

Joined with the issue of the 150-acre medical school site, the area of which had been expanded to triple the original request—an expansion regarded by the militants as an effort to dilute black political power by moving out Negro residents—the board of education battle resulted in a confrontation between the mayor and the militants. Both sides refused to alter their positions.



Wounded rioter escorted from violence scene, Newark, July 1967

Into this impasse stepped a Washington Negro named Albert Roy Osborne. A flamboyant, 42-year-old former wig salesman who called himself Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed and wore a black beret, he presided over a mythical "Blackman's Volunteer Army of Liberation." Articulate and magnetic, the self-commissioned "colonel" proved to be a one-man show. He brought Negro residents flocking to board of education and planning board meetings. The Colonel spoke in violent terms, and backed his words with violent action. At one meeting he tore the tape from the official stenographic recorder.

It became more and more evident to the militants that, though they might not be able to prevail, they could prevent the normal transaction of business. Filibustering began. A Negro former State assemblyman held the floor for more than 4 hours. One meeting of the board of education began at 5 p.m., and did not

adjourn until 3:23 a.m. Throughout the months of May and June, speaker after speaker warned that if the mayor persisted in naming a white man as secretary to the board of education and in moving ahead with plans for the medical school site, violence would ensue. The city administration played down the threats.

On June 27, when a new secretary to the board of education was to be named, the state police set up a command post in the Newark armory.

The militants, led by the local CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) chapter, disrupted and took over the board of education meeting. The outcome was a stalemate. The incumbent secretary decided to stay on another year. No one was satisfied.

At the beginning of July there were 24,000 unemployed Negroes within the city limits. Their ranks were swelled by an estimated 20,000 teenagers, many of whom, with school out and the summer recreation program curtailed due to a lack of funds, had no place to go.



Police, Guardsmen collar alleged looters, Newark, July 1967

On July 8, Newark and East Orange police attempted to disperse a group of Black Muslims. In the melee that followed, several police officers and Muslims suffered injuries necessitating medical treatment. The resulting charges and countercharges heightened the tension between police and Negroes.

Early on the evening of July 12, a cabdriver named John Smith began, according to police reports, tailgating a Newark police car. Smith was an unlikely candidate to set a riot in motion. Forty years old, a Georgian by birth, he had attended college for a year before entering the Army in 1950. In 1953 he had been honorably discharged with the rank of corporal. A chess-playing trumpet player, he had worked as a musician and a factory hand before, in 1963, becoming a cabdriver.

As a cabdriver, he appeared to be a hazard. Within a relatively short period of time he had eight or nine accidents. His license was revoked. When, with a

woman passenger in his cab, he was stopped by the police, he was in violation of that revocation.

From the high-rise towers of the Reverend William P. Hayes housing project, the residents can look down on the orange-red brick facade of the Fourth Precinct Police Station and observe every movement. Shortly after 9:30 p.m., people saw Smith, who either refused or was unable to walk, being dragged out of a police car and into the front door of the station.

Within a few minutes, at least two civil rights leaders received calls from a hysterical woman declaring a cabdriver was being beaten by the police. When one of the persons at the station notified the cab company of Smith's arrest, cabdrivers all over the city began learning of it over their cab radios.

A crowd formed on the grounds of the housing project across the narrow street from the station. As more and more people arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered to Smith became more and more exaggerated. The descriptions were supported by other complaints of police malpractice that, over the years, had been submitted for investigation—but had never been heard of again.

Several Negro community leaders, telephoned by a civil rights worker and informed of the deteriorating situation, rushed to the scene. By 10:15 p.m., the atmosphere had become so potentially explosive that Kenneth Melchior, the senior police inspector on the night watch, was called. He arrived at approximately 10:30 p.m.

Met by a delegation of civil rights leaders and militants who requested the right to see and interview Smith, Inspector Melchior acceded to their request.

When the delegation was taken to Smith, Melchior agreed with their observations that, as a result of injuries Smith had suffered, he needed to be examined by a doctor. Arrangements were made to have a police car transport him to the hospital.

Both within and outside of the police station, the atmosphere was electric with hostility. Carloads of police officers arriving for the 10:45 p.m. change of shifts were subjected to a gauntlet of catcalls, taunts, and curses.

Joined by Oliver Lofton, administrative director of the Newark Legal Services Project, the Negro community leaders inside the station requested an interview with Inspector Melchior. As they were talking to the inspector about initiating an investigation to determine how Smith had been injured, the crowd outside became more and more unruly. Two of the Negro spokesmen went outside to attempt to pacify the people.

There was little reaction to the spokesmen's appeal that the people go home. The second of the two had just finished speaking from atop a car when several Molotov cocktails smashed against the wall of the police station.

With the call of "Fire!" most of those inside the station, police officers and civilians alike, rushed out of the front door. The Molotov cocktails had splattered to the ground; the fire was quickly extinguished.

Inspector Melchior had a squad of men form a line across the front of the station. The police officers and the Negroes on the other side of the street exchanged volleys of profanity.

Three of the Negro leaders, Timothy Still of the United Community Corporation, Robert Curvin of CORE, and Lofton, requested they be given another opportunity to disperse the crowd. Inspector Melchior agreed to let them try and provided a bullhorn. It was apparent that the several hundred persons who had gathered in the street and on the grounds of the housing project were not going to disperse. Therefore, it was decided to attempt to channel the energies of the people into a nonviolent protest. While Lofton promised the crowd that a full investigation would be



Outside 4th Precinct Station House, Newark, July 1967

made of the Smith incident, the other Negro leaders urged those on the scene to form a line of march toward the city hall.

Some persons joined the line of march. Others milled about in the narrow street. From the dark grounds of the housing project came a barrage of rocks. Some of them fell among the crowd. Others hit persons in the line of march. Many smashed the windows of the police station. The rock throwing, it was believed, was the work of youngsters; approximately 2,500 children lived in the housing project.

Almost at the same time, an old car was set afire in a parking lot. The line of march began to disintegrate. The police, their heads protected by World War I-type helmets, sallied forth to disperse the crowd. A fire engine, arriving on the scene, was pelted with rocks. As police drove people away from the station, they scattered in all directions.

A few minutes later, a nearby liquor store was broken into. Some persons, seeing a caravan of cabs

appear at City Hall to protest Smith's arrest, interpreted this as evidence that the disturbance had been organized, and generated rumors to that effect.

However, only a few stores were looted. Within a short period of time the disorder ran its course.

The next afternoon, Thursday, July 13, the mayor described it as an isolated incident. At a meeting with Negro leaders to discuss measures to defuse the situation, he agreed to appoint the first Negro police captain, and announced that he would set up a panel of citizens to investigate the Smith arrest. To one civil rights leader, this sounded like "the playback of a record," and he walked out. Other observers reported that the mayor seemed unaware of the seriousness of the tensions.

The police were not. Unknown to the mayor, Dominick Spina, the Director of Police, had extended shifts from 8 hours to 12, and was in the process of mobilizing half the strength of the department for that evening. The night before, Spina had arrived at the Fourth Precinct Police Station at approximately midnight, and had witnessed the latter half of the disturbance. Earlier in the evening he had held the regularly weekly "open house" in his office. This was intended to give any person who wanted to talk to him an opportunity to

do so. Not a single person had shown up.

As director of police, Spina had initiated many new programs: police-precinct councils, composed of the police precinct captain and business and civic leaders, who would meet once a month to discuss mutual problems; Junior Crimefighters; a Boy Scout Explorer program for each precinct; mandatory human relations training for every officer; a Citizens' Observer Program, which permitted citizens to ride in police cars and observe activities in the stations; a Police Cadet program; and others.

Many of the programs initially had been received enthusiastically, but—as was the case with the "open house"—interest had fallen off. In general, the programs failed to reach the hard-core unemployed, the disaffected, the school dropouts—of whom Spina estimates there are 10,000 in Essex County—that constitute a major portion of the police problem.

Reports and rumors, including one that Smith had died, circulated through the Negro community. Tension continued to rise. Nowhere was the tension greater than at the Spirit House, the gathering place for Black Nationalists, Black Power advocates, and militants of every hue. Black Muslims, Orthodox Moslems, and members of the United Afro-American Association, a



Newark aftermath, July 1967

new and growing organization that follows, in general, the teachings of the late Malcolm X, came regularly to mingle and exchange views. Antiwhite playwright LeRoi Jones held workshops. The two police-Negro clashes, coming one on top of the other, coupled with the unresolved political issues, had created a state of crisis.

On Thursday, inflammatory leaflets were circulated in the neighborhoods of the Fourth Precinct. A "Police Brutality Protest Rally" was announced for early evening in front of the Fourth Precinct Station. Several television stations and newspapers sent news teams to interview people. Cameras were set up. A crowd gathered.

A picket line was formed to march in front of the police station. Between 7 and 7:30 p.m., James Threatt, executive director of the Newark Human Rights Commission, arrived to announce to the people the decision of the mayor to form a citizens group to investigate the Smith incident, and to elevate a Negro to the rank of captain.

The response from the loosely milling mass of people was derisive. One youngster shouted "Black Power!" Rocks were thrown at Threatt, a Negro. The barrage of missiles that followed placed the police station under siege.



Newark during July 1967 disorder

After the barrage had continued for some minutes, police came out to disperse the crowd. According to witnesses, there was little restraint of language or action by either side. A number of police officers and Negroes were injured.

As on the night before, once the people had been dispersed, reports of looting began to come in. Soon the glow of the first fire was seen.

Without enough men to establish control, the police set up a perimeter around a 2-mile stretch of Springfield Avenue, one of the principal business districts, where bands of youths roamed up and down smashing windows. Grocery and liquor stores, clothing and furniture stores, drugstores and cleaners, appliance stores

and pawnshops were the principal targets. Periodically, police officers would appear and fire their weapons over the heads of looters and rioters. Laden with stolen goods, people began returning to the housing projects.

Near midnight, activity appeared to taper off. The mayor told reporters the city had turned the corner.

As news of the disturbances had spread, however, people had flocked into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with impunity, many bowed to temptation and joined the looting.

Without the necessary personnel to make mass arrests, police were shooting into the air to clear stores. A Negro boy was wounded by a .22 caliber bullet said to have been fired by a white man riding in a car. Guns were reported stolen from a Sears, Roebuck store. Looting, fires, and gunshots were reported from a widening area. Between 2 and 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 14, the mayor decided to request Gov. Richard J. Hughes to dispatch the state police and National Guard troops. The first elements of the state police arrived with a sizeable contingent before dawn.

During the morning the Governor and the mayor, together with the police and National Guard officers, made a reconnaissance of the area. The police escort guarding the officials arrested looters as they went. By early afternoon the National Guard had set up 137



Newark, July 1967

roadblocks, and state police and riot teams were beginning to achieve control. Command of anti-riot operations was taken over by the Governor, who decreed a "hard line" in putting down the riot.

As a result of technical difficulties, such as the fact that the city and state police did not operate on the same radio wave-lengths, the three-way command structure—city police, state police and National Guard—worked poorly.

At 3:30 p.m. that afternoon, the family of Mrs. D. J. was standing near the upstairs windows of their apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furniture store on Springfield Avenue. Three carloads of

police rounded the corner. As the police yelled at the looters, they began running.

The police officers opened fire. A bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apartment. A moment later she heard a cry from the bedroom. Her 3-year-old daughter, Debbie, came running into the room. Blood was streaming down the left side of her face: the bullet had entered her eye. The child spent the next 2 months in the hospital. She lost the sight of her left eye and the hearing in her left ear.

Simultaneously, on the street below, Horace W. Morris, an associate director of the Washington Urban League who had been visiting relatives in Newark, was about to enter a car for the drive to Newark Airport. With him were his two brothers and his 73-year-old stepfather, Isaac Harrison. About 60 persons had been on the street watching the looting. As the police arrived, three of the looters cut directly in front of the group of spectators. The police fired at the looters. Bullets plowed into the spectators. Everyone began running. As Harrison, followed by the family, headed toward the apartment building in which he lived, a bullet kicked his legs out from under him. Horace Morris lifted him to his feet. Again he fell. Mr. Morris' brother, Virgil, attempted to pick the old man up. As he was doing so, he was hit in the left leg and right forearm. Mr. Morris and his other brother managed to drag the two wounded men into the vestibule of the building, jammed with 60 to 70 frightened, angry Negroes.

Bullets continued to spatter against the walls of the buildings. Finally, as the firing died down, Morris—whose stepfather died that evening—yelled to a sergeant that innocent people were being shot.

"Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," the sergeant, according to Morris, replied.

"They don't have guns; no one is shooting at you," Morris said.

"You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant yelled.

A short time later, at approximately 5 p.m., in the

same vicinity, a police detective was killed by a small caliber bullet. The origin of the shot could not be determined. Later during the riot, a fireman was killed by a .30 caliber bullet. Snipers were blamed for the deaths of both.

At 5:30 p.m., on Beacon Street, W. F. told J. S., whose 1959 Pontiac he had taken to the station for inspection, that his front brake needed fixing. J. S., who had just returned from work, went to the car which was parked in the street, jacked up the front end, took the wheel off, and got under the car.

The street was quiet. More than a dozen persons were sitting on porches, walking about, or shopping. None heard any shots. Suddenly several state troopers appeared at the corner of Springfield and Beacon. J. S. was startled by a shot clanging into the side of the garbage can next to his car. As he looked up he saw a state trooper with his rifle pointed at him. The next shot struck him in the right side.

At almost the same instant, K. G., standing on a porch, was struck in the right eye by a bullet. Both he and J. S. were critically injured.

At 8 p.m., Mrs. L. M. bundled her husband, her husband's brother, and her four sons into the family car to drive to a restaurant for dinner. On the return trip her husband, who was driving, panicked as he approached a National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, then quickly swerved around. A shot rang out. When the family reached home, everyone began piling out of the car. Ten-year-old Eddie failed to move. Shot through the head, he was dead.

Although, by nightfall, most of the looting and burning had ended, reports of sniper fire increased. The fire was, according to New Jersey National Guard reports, "deliberately or otherwise inaccurate." Maj. Gen. James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey National Guard, testified before an Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that "there was too much firing initially against snipers"



Derelict car ablaze in Newark disorder, July 1967

because of "confusion when we were finally called on for help and our thinking of it as a military action."

"As a matter of fact," Director of Police Spina told the Commission, "down in the Springfield Avenue area it was so bad that, in my opinion, Guardsmen were firing upon police and police were firing back at them * * *. I really don't believe there was as much sniping as we thought * * *. We have since compiled statistics indicating that there were 79 specified instances of sniping."

Several problems contributed to the misconceptions regarding snipers: the lack of communications; the fact that one shot might be reported half a dozen times by half a dozen different persons as it caromed and reverberated a mile or more through the city; the fact that the National Guard troops lacked riot training. They were, said a police official, "young and very scared," and had had little contact with Negroes.

Within the Guard itself contact with Negroes had certainly been limited. Although, in 1949, out of a force of 12,529 men there had been 1,183 Negroes, following the integration of the Guard in the 1950's the number had declined until, by July of 1967, there were 303 Negroes in a force of 17,529 men.

On Saturday, July 15, Spina received a report of snipers in a housing project. When he arrived he saw approximately 100 National Guardsmen and police officers crouching behind vehicles, hiding in corners and lying on the ground around the edge of the courtyard.

Since everything appeared quiet and it was broad daylight, Spina walked directly down the middle of the street. Nothing happened. As he came to the last building of the complex, he heard a shot. All around him the troopers jumped, believing themselves to be under sniper fire. A moment later a young Guardsman ran from behind a building.

The director of police went over and asked him if he had fired the shot. The soldier said yes, he had fired to scare a man away from a window; that his orders were to keep everyone away from windows.

Spina said he told the soldier: "Do you know what you just did? You have now created a state of hysteria. Every Guardsman up and down this street and every state policeman and every city policeman that is present thinks that somebody just fired a shot and that it is probably a sniper."

A short time later more "gunshots" were heard. Investigating, Spina came upon a Puerto Rican sitting on a wall. In reply to a question as to whether he knew "where the firing is coming from?" the man said:

"That's no firing. That's fireworks. If you look up to the fourth floor, you will see the people who are throwing down these cherry bombs."

By this time, four truckloads of National Guardsmen had arrived and troopers and policemen were again crouched everywhere, looking for a sniper. The direc-

tor of police remained at the scene for three hours, and the only shot fired was the one by the guardsman.

Nevertheless, at six o'clock that evening two columns of National Guardsmen and state troopers were directing mass fire at the Hayes Housing project in response to what they believed were snipers.

On the 10th floor, Eloise Spellman, the mother of several children, fell, a bullet through her neck.

Across the street, a number of persons, standing in an apartment window, were watching the firing directed at the housing project. Suddenly, several troopers whirled and began firing in the general direction of the spectators. Mrs. Hattie Gainer, a grandmother, sank to the floor.

A block away Rebecca Brown's 2-year-old daughter was standing at the window. Mrs. Brown rushed to drag her to safety. As Mrs. Brown was, momentarily, framed in the window, a bullet spun into her back. All three women died.



Post-riot food distribution at church in Newark, July 1967

A number of eye witnesses, at varying times and places, reported seeing bottles thrown from upper story windows. As these would land at the feet of an officer he would turn and fire. Thereupon, other officers and Guardsmen up and down the street would join in.

In order to protect his property, B. W. W., the owner of a Chinese laundry, had placed a sign saying "Soul Brother" in his window. Between 1 and 1:30 a.m., on Sunday, July 16, he, his mother, wife, and brother, were watching television in the back room. The neighborhood had been quiet. Suddenly, B. W. W. heard the sound of jeeps, then shots.

Going to an upstairs window he was able to look out into the street. There he observed several jeeps, from which soldiers and state troopers were firing into stores that had "Soul Brother" signs in the windows. During the course of three nights, according to dozens of eye witness reports, law enforcement officers shot into and smashed windows of businesses that contained signs indicating they were Negro-owned.

At 11 p.m., on Sunday, July 16, Mrs. Lucille Pugh looked out of the window to see if the streets were clear. She then asked her 11-year-old son, Michael, to take the garbage out. As he reached the street and was illuminated by a street light, a shot rang out. He died.

By Monday afternoon, July 17, state police and National Guard forces were withdrawn. That evening, a Catholic priest saw two Negro men walking down the street. They were carrying a case of soda and two bags of groceries. An unmarked car with five police officers pulled up beside them. Two white officers got out of the car. Accusing the Negro men of looting, the officers made them put the groceries on the sidewalk, then kicked the bags open, scattering their contents all over the street.

Telling the men, "Get out of here," the officers drove off. The Catholic priest went across the street to help gather up the groceries. One of the men turned to him: "I've just been back from Vietnam 2 days," he said, "and this is what I get. I feel like going home and getting a rifle and shooting the cops."

Of the 250 fire alarms, many had been false, and 13 were considered by the city to have been "serious." Of the \$10,251,000 damage total, four-fifths was due to stock loss. Damage to buildings and fixtures was less than \$2 million.

Twenty-three persons were killed—a white detective, a white fireman, and 21 Negroes. One was 73-year-old Isaac Harrison. Six were women. Two were children.

Teaching Strategies/Guiding Questions/"Big Ideas":

How did Newark play a role in the Northern Civil Rights movement?

The Civil Rights movement in the North is largely ignored, yet mapping and understanding how Newark was involved in the Northern Civil Rights movement is crucial to their understanding of where racism exists, the forms it took, and that all of America was culpable. Ask students how the Newark riots compared to the riots they have learned about in the North, such as Detroit. What remains the same? How do the tactics differ? What are the rioters claiming as the reason for the riots? Have the students use the primary sources to outline key parts of the Newark riots: the causes, the events, and the outcomes. Then, have students use these answers when comparing to other Civil Rights movements they are familiar with/have been taught about in the class.

How did riots in the North compare to riots in the South during the Civil Rights movement?

The Civil Rights movement in the South is largely what students consider to be the entire Civil Rights movement. Newark is an example of the large impact the North had on the Civil Rights movement and justice for Black Northerners. How does racism in the North compare to racism found in the South? Which of these institutions remain, despite "legally" being resolved? Why is dismantling institutional racism so difficult? Have the students use the primary sources and what rioters claim were the reasons for the riots to help answer these questions, then, have the students

compare Newark to riots they have learned about in the South, such as Selma. How do these riots differ? What remains the same? Which riots were more effective, and why do you think so?

Violence vs. Nonviolence

Riots that are discussed in classes during units on the Civil Rights movement are usually ones that remained nonviolent, yet violence also has a strong place among race riots. What is the purpose of using violence or nonviolence during a protest? Have the students read through the primary sources. Given the context you know of these riots, do you think the violence was justified (both by the rioters and by law enforcement) in Newark? Why or why not? Which type of riot was more effective, violent or nonviolent? Why do you think so? Would the results of the Newark riots have changed if they used nonviolence as opposed to violence, and why or why not?

Lesson Plan Attached in Following File

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_hwU-VeUM4_OsWs3VLMwtXMRna7TAGbrdOsTvkanC0/edit#n

Document-Based Question: Given the primary sources, were the Newark riots effective or ineffective? In your response, define what an “effective riot” is, and use four of the five sources to defend how you categorize the Newark riots. Consider what tactics rioters/law enforcement used, the effects of the riots in Newark and the Civil Rights movement as a whole, and whether the demands from the rioters were met or change was implemented systemically.

Annotated Bibliography

“50 Years Later, Newark Riots Recall an Era Echoed by Black Lives Matter.” NBCNews.com.

NBCUniversal News Group, July 12, 2017.

<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/50-years-later-newark-riots-recall-era-echoed-black-lives-n780856>.

This source was used to detail how the infrastructure of majority Black neighborhoods was consistently ignored while White neighborhoods received widespread infrastructure attention, leading to the argument that Black Americans were restricted to dilapidated, redlined housing.

Bates, Karen Grigsby. "Report Updates Landmark 1968 Racism Study, Finds More Poverty and Segregation." NPR. NPR, February 28, 2018.

<https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/589351779/report-updates-landmark-1968-racism-study-finds-more-poverty-more-segregation>.

This source was used to identify and provide background on the individual members of the Kerner Commission, specifically noting that only two members were not caucasian.

Bigart, Homer. "Newark Riot Panel Calls Police Action 'Excessive'; Newark Riot Panel

Charges Police Action against Negroes Was 'Excessive'." The New York Times. The New York Times, February 11, 1968.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1968/02/11/91220255.html?pageNumber=1>.

This source was used to correlate a lack of Black Police officers in the Newark Police Department with racially charged violence against Black citizens.

Bigart, Homer. "Newark Riot Deaths at 21 as Negro Sniping Widens." The New

York Times. The New York Times, July 16, 1967.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1967/07/16/archives/newark-riot-deaths-at-21-as-negro-sniping-widens-hughes-may-see-us.html?searchResultPosition=26>.

This source outlines the phenomenon of paranoia surrounding urban snipers, and it is used to qualify the number of fatalities and injuries during the Newark riots.

Carroll, Maurice. "Newark's Mayor Calls in Guard as Riots Spread." New York Times.

New York Times, July 14, 1967.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/14/83616047.html?pageNumber=1>.

This source was used to provide statistical data for the carnage during the Newark riots, and to further piece together the event and its effects.

CBS New York. "Newark Public Officials Reflect on 1967 Riots amidst New Protests: 'The City Has Now Begun to Rise from the Ashes'." CBS New York. CBS New York, June 1, 2020.

<https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2020/06/01/newark-riots-1967-protests/>.

This source was used to display how the Newark riots had a widespread negative impact mentally and emotionally on the Black citizens of Newark.

Haberman, Clyde. "The 1968 Kerner Commission Report Still Echoes Across America." The New York Times. The New York Times, June 23, 2020.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/kerner-commission-report.html>.

This source was used to identify the Kerner Commission's key points regarding race relations, and the extent to which it ignored Lyndon B. Johnson's hopes for the report to be a neutral case study that promoted his welfare programs.

Hampson, Rick. "Newark Riots, 50 Years Later." USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, July 12, 2017.

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/12/50-years-after-newark-trump-urban-america-inner-city-detroit/103525154/>.

This source was used to illustrate that much of the political power in Newark is held by disproportionately white corporations and individuals, and that the struggle for equality and representation for Black Newarkers has carried well into the 21st century.

“How the 1960s' Riots Hurt African-Americans.” National Bureau of Economic Research, September 9, 2004.

<https://www.nber.org/digest/sep04/how-1960s-riots-hurt-african-americans>.

This source details the motivating factors behind mid-century White flight, and the economic impact this ultimately had on the city.

“Outcomes and Impacts - the North.” RiseUp North Newark, July 13, 2021.

<https://riseupnewark.com/chapters/chapter-3/part-2/outcomes-and-impacts/>.

This source highlights the positive communal outcomes that came about from the Newark riots and the sense of unity and solidarity present amongst many civil rights activists.

Reeves, Richard. “Riots in Newark Are the Worst in Nation since 34 Died in Watts.” The New York Times. The New York Times, July 15, 1967.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/15/83617474.html?pageNumber=11>.

This source statistically confirms that, at the time, the Newark riots were the most fatal and destructive race riots since the riots in Watts, California two years prior. This lends to outlining the importance of researching the Newark riots themselves, as well as the effects of violence during the protests.

Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Bantam Books, 1968.

<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03997a&AN=RUL.b1155072&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

The *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, better known as the Kerner Commission Report, is a widely used source in this essay that explains the cause behind the spike of race riots in the 1960's, and provides much of the background and supporting evidence for this paper's thesis.

Rojas, Rick, and Khorri Atkinson. "Five Days of Unrest That Shaped, and Haunted, Newark."

The New York Times, July 11, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/nyregion/newark-riots-50-years.html>.

This source provides numerical evidence to the destruction caused by the Newark riots, including death count and property damage sums, which frames the consequences of the riots.

Treadwell, David. "After the Riots: The Search for Answers : For Blighted Newark, Effects of

Rioting in 1967 Still Remain : Redevelopment: The Once-Bustling Commercial

Thoroughfare at the Center of That City's Unrest Is Still an Urban Wasteland 25 Years Later." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, May 7, 1992.

<https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-05-07-mn-2525-story.html>.

This source details the shift in overall perception and reputation of Newark following the riots, specifically mentioning a decaying infrastructure and a paranoid and weary population.

Wills, Matthew. "The Kerner Commission Report on White Racism, 50 Years on ..." JSTOR

Daily, July 7, 2020.

<https://daily-jstor-org.ezproxy.usach.cl/the-kerner-commission-report-on-white-racism-50>

-years-on/.

This source elaborates on the differences between what President Lyndon B. Johnson hoped the Kerner commission would be and what it actually became; namely, Lyndon B. Johnson wanted a report that praised his Great Society policies. (The Kerner Commission would ultimately release a report that encapsulated the entire cause-and-effect chain of Black oppression.)

Wilson, B. L. "The Kerner Commission Report 50 Years Later." *GW Today*, December 7, 2018.

<https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/kerner-commission-report-50-years-later>.

This source serves to explain the ways in which the data drawn for the Kerner Commission has not been used effectively to improve the lives of Black Americans in urban areas, as income inequality and incarceration rates continue to rise.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Carol, *White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide*. 1st ed. Bloomsbury, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017.

Anderson argues that gerrymandering, suppressing black voters, and criminalizing Black communities through media representation were the primary challenges facing the Black community in the North. It is used to explain how Newark's housing leaders effectively rebranded racism in the Northern private sector to seem more palatable to middle-class whites.

Bentley-Edwards, Keisha L., Malik Chaka Edwards, Cynthia Neal Spence, William A. Darity Jr.,

Darrick Hamilton, and Jasson Perez. "How Does It Feel to Be a Problem? The Missing Kerner Commission Report." *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 4, no. 6 (2018): 20–40. <https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2018.4.6.02>.

This source makes the argument that the Kerner Report only views the struggle of Black Americans through the myopic lens of the destruction of white property, without sympathizing with Black Newarkers or making any attempt to justify their grievances. It is used to explain inherent flaws in the Kerner response and to expose what biases the men on said commission may have had.

Bergesen, Albert. "Race Riots of 1967: An Analysis of Police Violence in Detroit and Newark."

Journal of Black Studies 12, no. 3 (March 1, 1982): 261–74.

<https://search-ebscohost-com.rider.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.2784247&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

In this source, Bergesen argues that there is not enough systemic data in policing during the riots and examines the specific circumstances of each death during the 1967 Detroit and Newark riots to identify what police violence was explicitly done. This source is utilized to cite specific instances of fatalities during the Newark riots at the hands of brazenly violent police officers.

Lieberson, Stanley, and Christy A. Wilkinson. “A Comparison between Northern and Southern Blacks Residing in the North.” *Demography* 13, no. 2 (1976): 199–224.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2060801>.

Leiberson and Wilkinson compare and contrast factors such as employment, education, relationship status, and job type to compare Black migrants traveling across the United States and ultimately come to the conclusion that despite regional differences, Black Americans were largely treated equally poorly regardless of if they were native to a certain region or migrants from another. This source is utilized to elaborate on the Great Migration and establish Newark’s Black public sphere in the 20th century as one made up of Black Southern migrants moving to the North in pursuit of work.

Mumford, Kevin J. *Newark : A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America*. American History and Culture. New York University Press, 2007.

<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03997a&AN=RUL.b1408843&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

Mumford’s *Newark* is another heavily utilized source that provides a large scope of background information and context surrounding Newark as a city and the Newark riots, and ultimately argues that white flight, police brutality, and ethnic tensions led to the outbreak of rioting in

1967. This source is widely used to support arguments surrounding the large-scale exodus of middle class whites from Newark during the 40s and 50s.

Sugrue, Thomas J. "Northern Lights: The Black Freedom Struggle Outside the South." *OAH Magazine of History* 26, no. 1 (January 2012): 9–15. doi:10.1093/oahmag/oar052

In Thomas Sugrue's work "Northern Lights: The Black Freedom Struggle Outside the South," Sugrue argues that the historiography surrounding the Northern Civil Rights movement is changing, and that the violent turn in attitude as the movement crossed from the 1960s into the 1970s should not be considered a failure. This source is used to detail the changing and unique landscape of the Northern Civil Rights movement and how it differentiates itself from the Southern Civil Rights movement.

Sugrue, Thomas J. *Sweet Land of Liberty : The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North*. 1st ed. Random House, 2008.

This source argues that the North played a larger and more complex role in the Civil Rights movement than it is often given credit for, as Southern Black Americans traveled to the North and settled in cities that were seeing increasing numbers of its White tenants fleeing for the suburbs. This source provides useful background knowledge on the Great Migration and is an in-depth analysis of White flight, both in the north and beyond.

Theoharis, Jeanne, and Komozi Woodard. *Freedom North : Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980*. 1st ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03997a&AN=RUL.b1327086&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

In this source, Theoharris and Komozi argue that the general perspective of the Northern Civil Rights movement as an aggressive subordinate to the Southern Civil Rights Movement are

conceptions that lack historical basis. This source was used to expand on the formation of poor Black communities and the effects of redlining.

Consulted Sources

Robinson, Douglas. "Jersey Will Seek U.S. Funds to Rebuild Newark; Riot Victims Would

Get Food, Medicine, Business Loans and Money for Rent." The New York Times.

The New York Times, July 18, 1967.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/18/90375693.html?pageNumber=22>.

This source was consulted to piece together a more complete understanding of what happened during the Newark riots. Furthermore, it sheds light on the aftermath of the riots and the recovery effort that followed.

Sullivan, Ronald. "Negro Is Killed in Trenton." New York Times. New York Times, April

10, 1968.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1968/04/10/89130687.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0.

This source was consulted to provide additional context to the Newark riots by comparing the events to another instance of racially motivated violence in another city in New Jersey.

Waggoner, Walter H. "Courtrooms Calm as Trials Start for 27 Indicted in Newark Riots."

The New York Times. The New York Times, September 26, 1967.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/09/26/83634623.html?pageNumber=41>.

This article was consulted to detail and elaborate on the aftermath of the Newark riots, as well as how the city government responded to the violence of the protest and how it would examine the legal repercussions to riots from other key cities in the United States to frame what legal measures would be implemented.

Instructions: Make a copy of this document for each source. With a partner, write 1-2 sentences for each letter!

Name:

Title of Source:

Type of source:

A: Author -

P: Place and time -

P: Prior knowledge -

A: Audience -

R: Reason -

T: The Main Idea -

S: Significance -

Media Project: Newark Riots of 1967 (Grades 10th-11th)

<p>1) Central Focus/ Big Idea. Provide rationale that shows content knowledge.</p>	<p>The central focus of this lesson is to analyze the causes, events, and effects of the Newark riots, to bring the Civil Rights movement into the context of state history and the Newark riots into the larger context of the Northern and Southern Civil Rights movements, and to develop a deeper understanding of the debate surrounding the use of violence in the Civil Rights movement.</p>	
<p>2) Content Standards NJ Student Learning Standards (NJSL) align with central focus and learning objective(s).</p>	<p>6.1.12.CivicsPI.13.a: Craft an argument as to the effectiveness of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, New Jersey Supreme Court decisions (i.e., Hedgepeth and Williams v. Trenton Board of Education), and New Jersey’s laws in eliminating segregation and discrimination. 6.1.12.HistoryCC.13.c: Determine the impetus for the Civil Rights Movement and generate an evidence-based argument that evaluates the federal actions taken to ensure civil rights for African Americans.</p>	
<p>3) Learning Target(s)/Objectives: List appropriate, observable, and measurable objective(s) describing what learners are expected to be able to do at the end of the lesson.</p>	<p>Given five primary sources, students will be able to answer the DBQ: Given the primary sources, were the Newark riots effective or ineffective? In your response, define what an “effective riot” is, and use four of the five sources to defend how you categorize the Newark riots. Consider what tactics rioters/law enforcement used, the effects of the riots in Newark and the Civil Rights movement as a whole, and whether the demands from the rioters were met or change was implemented systemically, in 3-5 pages, citing information from four of the five sources to expand their points and use as evidence for their argument, with 85% accuracy.</p>	
<p>4) Academic Language and Supports - Teacher and student discourse uses the <u>vocabulary</u>, syntax, and representations specific to the content area to support student learning.</p>	<p>For this component, list the different terms, ideas, names, dates, or concepts that are central to this lesson. There are two major categories:</p>	
	<p>Information knowledge (IK): content, basic information, names/dates/places; the “what” Example: what was the name and birthdate of the first President of the United States?</p>	<p>Procedural knowledge (PK): higher-order thinking, critical skills, comparison, analysis, synthesis; the “how” Example: which president was more effective in office—Abraham Lincoln or Lyndon Johnson? Why?</p>
	<p>Information Knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● When did the Newark riots take place? ● What was the inciting event of the Newark riots? What other context is there for the riots given the larger Civil Rights movement? ● What are the definitions of “violence” and “nonviolence” in the context of the Civil Rights movement? ● What is institutional/privatized racism? ● What measures of discrimination existed in the South compared to the North? ● How many days did the Newark riots take place? <p>Procedural Knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Why did the Newark riots result in violence? ● Why do Northern Civil Rights movement protests and rioting often use violence, while Southern riots use peaceful protesting? ● Why is the Newark riots important to New Jersey’s history? 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Why do you think it is often overlooked in history classes and when discussing the Civil Rights movement? • What racism and discrimination that Newark rioters were protesting against still exist today? • Is it harder to dismantle institutionalized racism compared to other types of racism? Why/why not?
5) Materials List appropriate resources used to engage learners.	<input type="checkbox"/> Laptops <input type="checkbox"/> Copies of the Primary Sources (available online and in print for students who prefer hard copies/have accommodations) <input type="checkbox"/> Canvas
6) Technology Describe how technology was considered for promoting learner engagement.	The technology for this lesson includes laptops for the students to write their essays with and the digital copies of the resources they must use to defend their argument. Having the students use laptops promotes their skills using Google Docs which is a practical skill that can be transferred to their daily lives and in other subjects outside of Social Studies. Using laptops also promotes their engagement by making the essay easier to read, so that when they peer review anonymously, handwriting does not give away which student wrote each essay and allows each student to read each other's works without the difficulty of illegible handwriting, as well as allow practice with the commenting function in Google Docs.
7) Prior Knowledge Identify the knowledge, skills, and/or academic language necessary to prepare learners for this lesson.	Prior knowledge for this lesson includes previous discussions in Social Studies classes about the Civil Rights movement, information on how Black Americans were discriminated against since their arrival in the United States/the New World, and what discrimination still exists today. Students must have prior knowledge and skills of assessing primary sources, including APPARTS, and have practice in writing and supporting arguments in an essay-style format.
8) Content Description Indicate relevance of content concepts through pedagogy appropriate for content as well as student development and engagement	See above: Central Focus and Objectives.
10) Lesson Beginning How will the lesson start and engage learners?	Day 1: 1. Teacher will begin the class with a brief discussion on what students think of when they hear the term "Civil Rights movement". Teacher will use scaffold questioning to encourage critical thinking and introduce the Newark riots, including questions such as "Did the Civil Rights movement exist in New Jersey? Did it exist in the same way? Where/What were some protests that took place? Can you name some Civil Rights protests that happened in the Northern United States? Why do you think of other riots and protests (i.e. Selma) instead of those in Newark or Detroit?" etc., preparing students to discuss the Civil Rights movement in the context of New Jersey's state history.

<p>11) Lesson Body Instructional strategies outlined to facilitate student learning</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Teacher will instruct students to open their Canvas page and go to the current module. 3. Teacher will explain to students the five sources they will be reading, giving context on the Newark riots and connecting the riots to what students have already learned about the Civil Rights movement. 4. Teacher will have students discuss in pairs the different sources, completing the APPARTS document in the module for each source to aid in their analysis of the sources. 5. The end of Day 1: Students will recollect for a discussion with the teacher about what they found in the sources, what potential arguments they could make, and what sources could be used to support those arguments. 6. Teacher will share with students the DBQ prompt sheet, and go through the instructions with the class. Teacher will tell students that the DBQ will not be assigned till the next class period, in which they will spend the entirety of the class period writing their essays. 7. Teacher will allow the students the rest of their class period to outline their DBQs <p>Day 2:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Teacher will remind students about the instructions of the DBQ essay, what the students are to do, to completely answer each part of the question, and to use four of the five sources to support their arguments. 2. Teacher will allow students the rest of the class time to write their DBQs, assisting students when needed.
<p>12) Lesson End/Closure How will the lesson end to promote student learning and application?</p>	<p>Day 3:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Teacher will make copies of each students' essays and distribute them anonymously through Canvas, 2. Teacher will instruct students to read two of the essays and leave comments on Google Docs, including what each author did well and what could use improvement. (This allows students to gain peer-editing skills, as well as skills navigating Google Docs). 3. For the final 15 minutes of class, students will be allowed to look at comments on their essays and revise what they have written, taking into consideration each comment. 4. Teacher will provide the feedback from each essay to the student who wrote the essay, and will then grade the DBQs using the attached rubric. 5. Teacher will post a discussion board on Canvas that allows students to ask any questions they may still have on the topic, and the teacher will respond to each post.
<p>13) Assessment How will you know objective(s) were met? How will you analyze data? How will you provide information?</p>	<p>Students will be assessed by their completed DBQ essays. Students will be assessed on whether they responded to each part of the DBQ questions, the clearness of their argument and whether it can be proved using the sources. They will also be assessed on whether they used four of the five primary sources as evidence in their paper, and whether that evidence backs their claims.</p>

15) References

Cite resources used to research and support the instructional planning.

Sources used to develop and provide context to this lesson are located in the “Annotated Bibliography” in the previous file.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KHfEqmpYdBJ834wN33NZG_NpFzao-EtxNsVxgxCV3H0/edit?usp=sharing

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pKiMEv85IImFBXMj53BD-uVp0YXvBR4ZxqfVbsXJOB8/edit?usp=sharing>

Instructions: You will spend a full class period independently answering the following DBQ in paragraph essay format. Use four of the five primary sources to support your argument (Cite the sources as they are numbered on Canvas). Make sure to include an introduction and conclusion, and to analyze why the evidence from the sources you chose support your claims! When you are finished, submit your essay via Google Docs on Canvas in the following format: “Last name, First Name: DBQ”.

DBQ: Given the primary sources, were the Newark riots effective or ineffective? In your response, define what an “effective riot” is, and use four of the five sources to defend how you categorize the Newark riots. Consider what tactics rioters/law enforcement used, the effects of the riots in Newark and the Civil Rights movement as a whole, and whether the demands from the rioters were met or change was implemented systemically.

Rubric:

Persuasive Essay : DBQ: Newark Riots of 1967

Teacher Name: **Ms. Burd**

Student Name: _____

CATEGORY	4 - Above Standards	3 - Meets Standards	2 - Approaching Standards	1 - Below Standards	Score
Focus or Thesis Statement	The thesis statement names the topic of the essay and outlines the main points to be discussed.	The thesis statement names the topic of the essay.	The thesis statement outlines some or all of the main points to be discussed but does not name the topic.	The thesis statement does not name the topic AND does not preview what will be discussed.	
Evidence and Examples	Student uses and cites 4 of the 5 primary sources, and explanations are given that show how each piece of evidence supports the author's position.	Student uses and cites 3 of the 5 primary sources, and explanations are given that show how each piece of evidence supports the author's position.	Student uses and cites 1-2 of the 5 primary sources, and explanations are given that shows how each piece of evidence supports the author's position.	Student uses and cites 0 of the 5 primary sources, and no explanations are given.	
Grammar & Spelling	Author makes no errors in grammar or spelling that distract the reader from the content.	Author makes 1-5 errors in grammar or spelling that distract the reader from the content.	Author makes 5-9 errors in grammar or spelling that distract the reader from the content.	Author makes more than 10 errors in grammar or spelling that distract the reader from the content.	
Peer Review	Student contributed meaningful comments to two students' essays, providing feedback on what they liked about the essay and what could use improvement.	Student contributed meaningful comments to one of the students' essays, providing feedback on what they liked about the essay and what could use improvement.	Student contributed comments to two students' essays, providing feedback on either what they liked about the essay OR what could use improvement.	Student did not contribute comments on any of the students' essays, and did not provide feedback on what they liked about the essay OR what could use improvement.	